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Abstract 
The paper reviews the effects of lesions to the frontal cortex in so far as they impact on the 
ability to carry out active thought, namely to reason, think flexibly, produce strategies and 
formulate and realise plans.  How relevant neuropsychological studies should be carried out 
and why are discussed. The relation between active thought and each of intelligence and 
language are considered. The following basic processes necessary for effective active thought 
are reviewed: concentration, set-switching, inhibiting potentiated responses and monitoring 
and checking. Different forms of active thought are then addressed: abstraction, deduction, 
reasoning in well-structured and ill-structured problem spaces, novel strategy generation and 
planning. It is concluded that neuropsychological findings are valuable for providing 
information on systems rather than networks, and especially concerning prefrontal 
lateralisation of function. A synthesis is presented of the respective roles of the left and right 
lateral prefrontal cortex in active thought. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Overall Perspective  
 This paper is concerned with what neuropsychological findings can tell us about the 
cognitive processes underlying active thinking. By active thinking we refer to mental 
processes that allow us to confront situations where we do not respond routinely to the 
environment but rather we effectively address problems which can be big or small. Active 
thinking entails a set of complex mental processes for example, those involved in abstraction, 
deduction and other forms of reasoning between alternative possibilities, switching lines of 
thought,  strategy selection, inhibition of obvious responses and formulating and realising 
plans.   For example, organizing a dinner party would entail many active thinking processes 
whereas day-dreaming or implicit processes like priming would not be considered active 
thinking. 
A number of well-known neuropsychological tests designed to assess prefrontal function 
require active thinking. Typical examples are tests such as Wisconsin Card-Sorting 
(switching lines of thought), Proverb Interpretation (abstraction), Stroop (inhibition) Tower 
of Hanoi (planning) and tests of fluid intelligence such as Progressive Matrices or Cattell 
Culture Fair (reasoning between alternative possibilities).  Following frontal lobe lesions, 
performance on these tests is typically impaired. This suggests that the frontal lobes are 
critically involved in active thinking.  
Impairments in active thinking are also exemplified by a number of frontal lobe syndromes 
which involve release of irrelevant environmentally triggered actions. Examples include the 
grasp reflex, where the patient is repeatedly instructed not to grasp the doctor’s finger as the 
patient’s palm is stroked, and yet does so (De Renzi & Barbieri, 1992) or the somewhat 
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analogous situation where the patient should not move their eyes to a distracting light but 
does so (Paus et al. 1991).  At a higher level, there is utilisation behavior, originally described 
by Lhermitte (1983). In this case the patient makes a standard afforded action to one of the 
objects surrounding him, such as dealing from a pack of cards, without being told to do so, or 
in the so-called incidental form, when explicitly told to do something else (Shallice et al, 
1989). These examples highlight behaviors that occur when active thinking processes are 
absent or impaired through brain injury. Interestingly, these syndromes have been most 
frequently described in patients with lesions involving medial frontal areas (see De Renzi & 
Barbieri, 1992).    
Prefrontal functions are involved in many different cognitive domains. They have been well 
reviewed fairly recently by Sczepanski & Knight (2014). This paper will therefore focus only 
on those cognitive domains we consider critical for active thinking. Thus we will discuss 
individual cognition rather than social and on-going reasoning rather than (long-term) 
memory, learning, motivation and emotion.  
Our paper is structured in the following fashion.  The Introductory section will consider why 
neuropsychological evidence is chosen for review of the cognitive processes underlying 
active thinking, out of the many cognitive neuroscience techniques available. We then 
address the methodological approaches adopted for the neuropsychological investigation of 
prefrontal functions. The second section will briefly outline our  theoretical framework for 
active thinking, which is  largely  based on the Norman and Shallice (1986) Supervisory 
System model of prefrontal cortex (PFC) functioning. We will also consider the relationship 
between active thinking and potentially overlapping cognitive domains such as intelligence 
and language. The third section will deal with processes that are prerequisites for active 
thinking, namely concentration, set-shifting, thought inhibition, and monitoring and 
checking.  In the fourth section we will discuss different types of core active thinking 
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processes including abstraction, deduction, novel strategy selection, insight, and planning. 
The final section aims to produce an overall theoretical synthesis. 
Why neuropsychology? 
As cognitive processes become more abstract and distant from sensory and motor processes, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to investigate them adequately using behavioral means 
alone. Thus, taking theorists working on reasoning about syllogisms, Khemlani & Johnson-
Laird (2012) wrote “…Thirty-five years ago they had only heuristic accounts that explained 
biases and errors, and so the domain appeared to be an excellent test case for cognitive 
science. There are now 12 sorts of theories of syllogisms and monadic inferences, and so 
skeptics may well conclude that cognitive science has failed…” (p.453). A more powerful 
source of empirical findings seems to be required. Obvious candidates are methodologies 
related to the brain. 
 
Within human cognitive neuroscience there are two main classes of methodologies. The 
oldest class are those derived from lesion studies of neurological patients, which have 
recently been supplemented by TMS, and somewhat more conceptually distant, by the 
cognitive effects of individual differences in brain structure across the normal population. 
The second class are those where on-line measures are taken of brain processes while normal 
subjects carry out tasks – PET, fMRI, EEG, MEG and so on.  
 
If one’s aim is to provide accurate anatomical correspondences for known cognitive 
processes or to provide real-time information on processing, the second class are much to be 
preferred.  Despite this clear advantage of the second class of methodology, the first-class, 
especially neuropsychology, have complimentary advantages for the development of 
cognitive theory. This is for at least five reasons:  
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(i) If one takes cognitive theory to refer to models like classic box-and-arrow 
information-processing ones, then neuropsychological data can speak directly to 
cognitive theory. Appropriate inferences are derived from a set of simple 
assumptions, first formalised by Caramazza (1986). They are based on the idea of 
subtraction of components from an overall system.  Of course, subtraction in 
reality is complicated by complex processes related to the recovery process (see 
Henson et al, 2016 for a good example). However, to a first approximation, 
subtraction is a plausible characterisation of the effect of a brain lesion. So, this 
approach was much used in the heyday of cognitive neuropsychology. Moreover, 
the same set of assumptions can be used to relate such data to connectionist 
models too (Shallice & Cooper, 2011). By contrast, methodologies of the second 
type require complex bridging assumptions, based on physics and physiology, to 
relate their data to cognitive theory.  
(ii) It is generally accepted that activation-based findings do not necessarily imply 
causal efficacy (see Giliae-Dotan et al, 2015 for a particularly clear example). 
This possibility is of particular concern for lateralisation of function. Thus, 
neuropsychological data show language functions to be strongly lateralised. 
Crossed aphasia is very rare. In a consecutive series of over 1200 aphasics with 
unilateral lesions, only 4% had right hemisphere lesions (Croquelois & 
Bogousslavsky, 2011). However, neuroimaging studies of language processing 
often report bilateral activation patterns, if somewhat smaller in size in the right 
hemisphere (Jung-Beeman, 2005).  So, considering merely presence or absence of 
activation may in effect hide real lateralisation of function.  . 
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(iii) Neuropsychological data provide additional sources of behavioral evidence that 
are not generally available from other cognitive neuroscience methods, namely the 
nature of the responses, in particular, errors made.  These can be very informative 
for specifying the function damaged. We will consider later two examples, of the 
concrete interpretation of proverbs and of strategy-reflecting responses. 
(iv) When carrying out a cognitive neuroscience study on neurologically intact 
subjects, one is reliant on the theoretical framework of the investigators to set up 
the experimental question and design. Neurological patients can produce 
behaviors strikingly challenging theoretical preconceptions.  Phineas Gage and 
HM are the most famous such cases, but there are many others.  They facilitate 
serendipity.  
(v) Some problem-solving situations involve a single step change, where the subject 
makes a single change in strategy. Examples are those involving insight (see 
section four on Novel strategy selection and insight). They cannot be effectively 
studied using standard activation-based methods that require summing over 
multiple trials, since the critical situations cannot be reproduced; a repeat would 
no longer be novel. Instead damage to the relevant systems may prevent strategy 
change occurring, hence allowing relevant investigation. 
 
We will therefore address primarily findings from neuropsychological studies, and consider 
other methodologies where their findings help interpret our principal type. Of course, 
neuropsychological methods have their own limitations, which we now discuss.   
The neuropsychological approach to frontal functions. 
Three main types of method have been used by researchers concerned with making 
inferences about normal cognitive function from neuropsychological data – the single case 
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study (including its close relation – the multiple single case study), the case series and the 
group study.  On the first approach individual patients are selected for study depending on 
their theoretical interest. In the second and third, all patients who fit the appropriate criteria 
are reported. On the second approach each patient is treated as a separate test of relevant 
theories, whilst on the third approach, results are averaged across all patients in a group.   
 
Historically, researchers have tended to favour one approach and reject others.  Instead, one 
of us (Shallice, 2015) has argued that all three approaches are legitimate, but have different 
potential problems, and so are more powerful in combination.  This needs to be qualified, as 
far as prefrontal functions are concerned. Often performance of paradigms sensitive to 
prefrontal lesions can have a large range of performance in the normal population – consider 
as an example the Stroop test.  Impairment then becomes more easily detected using group 
studies, due to variance reduction with increased n.  
 
In practice, the anatomically based group study, where the patient is allocated to a group 
according to their site of lesion, is the most widely used method for studying prefrontal 
functions. It comes in two forms. In one, the more traditional approach the anatomical 
regions are decided a priori. In the oldest such version, the classical approach, there is simply 
a comparison between unilateral left and  right frontal lesioned patients. In a more refined 
approach (the Stuss-Alexander method), frontal patients are divided into left lateral, right 
lateral, superior medial and inferior medial (including orbital), this division being based 
partly on statistical grounds and partly on clinical ones (Stuss et al, 1998).  In the modified 
Stuss-Alexander method the two medial groups are combined. 
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The alternative approach (the critical lesion localisation method)  uses the range of 
performance produced by patients in a series. It determines whether there are patients with 
lesions in a particular region who perform worse than those with lesions elsewhere, without 
specifying the region in advance.  A package is used   such as Voxel-based Lesion Symptom 
Mapping (VLSM) - now sometimes called Lesion Behavior Mapping (LBM)  (Bates et al, 
2003; Rorden & Karnath, 2004).  
 
Recently, Mah et al (2014) have criticised existing methods of this type, which make the 
simplifying assumption that damage to any voxel is independent of that to any other voxel.  
Unfortunately, the assumption is flawed when applied to brain lesions caused by stroke. In 
this case, the arterial tree structure of the vascular system means that there will be a high 
correlation between damage to functionally critical and non-critical regions fed by the same 
artery.  Mah et al advocated a high-dimensional multi-variate approach. However, to our 
knowledge, this has yet to be applied in an analysis of the effects of prefrontal lesions. 
Related criticisms may apply to brain tumours, but if they do the associated non-critical 
regions will not be the same. This makes replication, especially across aetiology, very useful. 
This is also so for a second problem – the existence of large ‘silent’ regions due to 
insufficient patients for complete coverage.  
 
In fact, for the purpose of drawing inferences to the separability of executive systems, the 
precise anatomical location of a critical area is not important. Performance on a given test 
requires many subprocesses.   So, the inferential logic of cognitive neuropsychology depends 
on the relative performance of the patient across multiple tests. We will adopt an analogous 
approach using groups.  If, the critical areas for one test do not overlap with those of another, 
we will take this as evidence that the two tests do not rely on the same set of subsystems.  We 
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will discuss later how two tests that appear to involve inhibition - the Stroop and the Hayling 
B Sentence Completion Test - lateralise differently in PFC, and therefore that the most 
critical processes for performing the two tests differ. 
 
Instead, there can be commonality of lesion area in the performance of different tests. This 
then puts on the intellectual agenda, the possibility that the cognitive resources required by 
test performance may overlap cognitively as well as anatomically. For example, Tsuchida & 
Fellows (2013) used VLSM on the performance of 45 frontal patients on three tests – task-
switching, the Stroop and a spatial search task.  The authors found similar left ventrolateral 
critical regions for the first two tasks. A different more medial region was critical for the 
spatial search task.  The authors held that the existence of a common critical area for the first 
two tasks meant that “..they are likely to be related to disruption of a single underlying 
process..” (p.1797). We consider that it provides suggestive evidence only. 
 
Adopting a group study methodology is though beset with a host of methodological 
problems.  Typically, patients differ widely in age and premorbid cognitive abilities.  In 
addition, lesions vary greatly in aetiology and size. Moreover, these two types of factor can 
interact in a complex fashion. Thus, Cipolotti et al (2016) examined two tests sensitive to 
prefrontal damage – Advanced Progressive Matrices and Stroop. Increasing age was found to 
exacerbate the effects of frontal damage, as measured using age-specific norms. This 
exacerbated age effect on executive performance in frontal patients was not ameliorated by 
proxies of cognitive reserve such as education or IQ (Macpherson et al, in press). This 
suggests that any behavioral effect of a lesion can only manifest itself when influenced by 
many strong confounding factors.  Large samples of patients and well-matched subgroups are 
therefore required. 
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How, then is one to proceed in practice? One approach is to limit the sample by, say, 
restricting selection to a particular type of aetiology such as vascular. Thus patients in 
subgroups should then be better matched, In support of this view; Karnath & Steinbach 
(2011) argue that it is best to restrict patient samples to those suffering strokes and  reject 
other aetiologies in particular, tumours. The authors suggest that the effects of tumours are 
too diffuse and not well localised. In fact, there are clear examples showing that post-
operatively tumours can give strong localisation effects (for a particularly clear example see 
Papagno et al, 2011). Moreover, if one was to include only patients with vascular lesions, 
collecting a large sample of frontal patients with well-matched subgroups for a new set of 
tests would in practice take much too long. 
 
A common practice, therefore, is to mix different aetiologies in the patient sample, in order to 
obtain a large enough group.  But are the effects of strokes and tumours, say, even roughly 
equivalent when affecting similar parts of cortex? To answer this question, Cipolotti et al 
(2015a) et al compared 100 frontal patients with four different types of aetiology on four 
frontal executive tasks (Advanced Progressive Matrices, Stroop Colour-Word Test, Letter 
Fluency-S; Trail Making Test Part B).  The four groups consisted of one vascular group and 
three with different types of tumour - high-grade gliomas, low-grade gliomas and 
meningiomas. The groups did not differ significantly in size or location of lesion. Strong 
behavioral effects were found of age and premorbid cognitive abilities on performance of the 
frontal tests. However, on only one test – Trail-Making Part B - was a significant difference 
between aetiologies obtained when age was partialled out in an ANCOVA.  Critically, the 
significance did not survive Bonferroni correction, as there was no reason to consider Trail-
Making, which later research shows not to be specific for frontal lesions (Chan et al, 2015), 
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to be  more susceptible to differences in aetiology than the other three tests. We therefore 
conclude that it is acceptable practice to mix aetiologies to overcome the great variability in 
the population under study.   
 
We will therefore include all types of neuropsychological method in our paper, but 
concentrate on the a priori groups approach. We will note the number of relevant patients as 
small group size results are especially likely to be biased by the idiosyncracies of a few 
patients or by imperfect matching across subgroups.   
 
BROAD BRUSH ASPECTS OF ACTIVE THOUGHT 
Dual system brain-based models of cognitive control   
Within the reasoning literature a variety of so-called dual system models have been put 
forward.  Most of them differentiate between a fast, automatic and unconscious mode of 
processing and a slow deliberate conscious one (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  In the 
reasoning field, the two are often called the products of system 1 and system 2 respectively 
(Stanovich, 1999).  
Before the development of dual system models of reasoning, the Russian neuropsychologist 
Alexander Luria (1966) had argued that neuropsychological evidence supports a theoretical 
framework in which prefrontal cortex contains a system for the programming, regulation and 
verification of activity-adopting the terminology of the reasoning literature, a system 2. This 
prefrontal system implements its functioning by calling upon more posterior systems in the 
cortex - a system 1. A number of neuroscientists have adopted a related type of dual system 
model framework for conceptualising PFC function in information-processing terms (see, 
Shallice, 1982, Miller & Cohen, 2001 and Duncan, 2010). In this article, we will adopt 
Norman & Shallice’s (1986) framework. 
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Contention Scheduling – the system 1 of this framework - is the lower level control system 
which can effect routine thought and action operations. It operates in production-system 
fashion including selecting action and thought schemas involving more posterior dedicated 
processing systems and connections (Cooper & Shallice, 2000).  The syndromes discussed in 
the Introductory section as examples of non-active thought, such as utilization behavior, 
represent Contention Scheduling  operating in isolation. 
If Contention Scheduling cannot cope with a non-routine situation, a second higher-level 
control system comes into play, the Supervisory System, held to be in prefrontal cortex. The 
Supervisory System is responsible for the control mechanisms that modulate Contention 
Scheduling top-down by boosting relevant action and thought schemas to allow novel goal 
directed behavior. The Supervisory System is loosely equivalent to the Executive System or 
Control Processes in other theoretical frameworks. Where it differs is being more specific 
about what it modulates and how. It is the key system involved in active thinking.     
Another major brain-based model also descending intellectually from Luria’s ideas is the 
multiple demand network approach of Duncan (2010). Duncan & Owen (2000a) using 
neuroimaging found that more difficult tasks in many different domains - such as perception, 
response selection   and working memory – activate the same set of regions, mainly in the 
frontal and parietal cortices, so-called multiple demand regions. These regions are held to 
have the function of programming other regions of the brain to carry out non-automatic tasks. 
This is a similar function to that held to be carried out by a Supervisory System. Duncan 
(2013) also argues that “…the fMRI literature contains little consensus on clear repeatable 
functional distinctions” (p 41) between different regions within the multiple demand network. 
We will address how the neuropsychological evidence relates to the two models and to 
equipotentiality later. 
Active thought and intelligence 
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Duncan et al (2000) also argued that the multiple demand regions are the seat of fluid 
intelligence, g. Thus they made a major link to another cognitive domain, intelligence, and 
aim to support g as a solid scientific concept. 
The neuropsychological literature does not support the idea that reduced fluid intelligence is a 
sufficient account of frontal patients’ executive impairments.  Roca et al (2010) showed it is 
for some tests (eg. Wisconsin Card-Sorting).  However, for others such as the Hayling B , 
both they and Cipolotti and colleagues (2016) have demonstrated that frontal patients’ 
impairment cannot be fully explained by reduced fluid intelligence.   Similarly impairments 
in other executive tests such as Stroop and Proverb Interpretation were shown not to be 
accounted by an effect on g.   
 
Duncan & Owen’s claim about fluid intelligence was, though, specifically about multiple 
demand regions. To test that, Woolgar et al (2010) gave the Cattell Culture Fair IQ test to 80 
patients with cortical lesions. The volume of lesions in multiple demand regions and outside 
those regions was assessed. For the group as a whole, there was a significant correlation 
between the IQ score and MD-volume, and the result remained highly significant when total 
lesion volume was partialled out. However, for the 44 pure frontal patients, the correlation 
was no longer significant, if non-MD-volume was partialled out. So, as far as PFC is 
concerned, the theoretical claim was not strongly supported from neuropsychology. 
Active Thought and Language 
Thought and language processes are intertwined in numerous complex ways (Gentner & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2003), but in the mature adult brain how independently can active thought 
take place without language?  One potential line of evidence comes from aphasia: can 
aphasics reason? This has been investigated in quite a number of aphasic patients in whom 
relatively preserved reasoning has been shown (Varley et al, 2014).  However, studies have 
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tended to be rather loose, relying on essentially clinical reports or on a fairly crude analysis of 
the processing problems of the patients.  An exception is the study of Varley et al (2005) 
where three patients with severe problems in comprehension and production of syntax were 
given a variety of arithmetic and calculation tasks.  Two of the patients were near ceiling on 
some calculation tasks with quasi-syntactic aspects, such as three figure subtraction, 
including problems with negative answers. They also performed adequately, but not 
perfectly, on problems involving interpretation of brackets. Thus it appeared that the 
understanding and execution of syntactic operations could be relatively preserved in 
arithmetic, when such operations were severely impaired in language. 
 
Grammatical encoding is, however, part of what  Levelt (1989) characterised as the 
Formulator stage of language production.  It can be inferred from such studies that the 
Formulator and Articulator stages operate relatively specifically within the language domain 
as opposed to the thought domain.  The key issue therefore relates to the so-called 
Conceptualizer stage, which precedes them in language production. It produces what Levelt 
calls the preverbal message, which on our approach requires active thought.  Can, however, 
active thought occur without the involvement of Conceptualizer stage processes?  
 
A relatively little-known aphasia syndrome bears on this question. This is a subtype of the 
clinical category of transcortical motor aphasia, called dynamic aphasia, first described by 
Luria (1970).  He described two patients who could answer questions but were incapable of 
narrative speech. In dynamic aphasia, the inner mechanics of the language system – the 
Formulator and Articulator stages – appear to operate relatively normally, but the patient says 
little especially in spontaneous speech. For instance, patient ROH of Costello & Warrington 
(1989), when asked to describe his last holiday, produced in 30s only “I’m ..”.  Typically in 
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sentence generation tasks the patient failed to produce a response or was extremely slow.  
However, some direct questions could be answered appropriately and any sentence that was 
produced was lexically, syntactically and morphologically correct.  What appears to be 
impaired is the Conceptualizer stage. 
 
About 10 other patients of this type have been described as single cases. A massive influence 
on the performance of these patients is the range of alternatives that are potentially available 
to the speaker (Robinson et al, 1998).  When this is high, the dynamic aphasia patient 
typically cannot respond. But, when the situation allows only a very restricted set of 
possibilities, the patient typically produces a correct sentence.  For instance, patient ANG of 
Robinson et al,  was given a range of tasks which involved this contrast. Thus, when she was 
asked to produce a sentence including a common object such as telephone, which was shown 
as a picture, she scored 0/6. On the other hand, when presented with a simple scene to 
describe (e.g a girl ice skating), she scored 34/34. When asked to produce a sentence 
including a single proper name (e.g. Hitler) she scored 26/28, saying for instance “Hitler is 
one of those wicked people that should never have been born”.  But given a single common 
name (e.g. sea), where the range of alternatives is greater, she scored only 14/28, saying in 
this case “no idea”.  
 
Related results were obtained at the same time by Thompson-Schill et al (1998) using a task 
in which patients were asked to generate a verb given a noun. Nouns were divided into two 
groups according to the diversity of responses given by controls. Four patients with posterior 
left inferior frontal lesions had significantly more difficulty with “high selection” (ie. 
inconsistent) verbs than with “low selection” verbs, compared with controls. Nine patients 
with lesions elsewhere in the frontal lobes did not have this problem. 
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ANG, too, had a left inferior frontal gyrus lesion. This localisation of the main form of 
dynamic aphasia is supported by a group study. Robinson et al (2010) found that a subgroup 
of 12 patients with lesions involving the left inferior frontal gyrus was significantly worse 
than 35 patients with other frontal lesions and normal controls in generating a sentence from 
a high-frequency word, but not for low-frequency words where selection requirements would 
be less.  
 
These findings all fit with the dynamic aphasic patient’s inability being one of constructing 
the preverbal message at the Conceptualiser stage, if this is at all difficult because there are 
many alternative possibilities. Is this a problem that affects active thought processes in 
situations where language is not required? Individual dynamic aphasic patients can perform 
apparently much better on reasoning tasks. For instance, patient CH (Robinson et al, 2005), a 
similar dynamic aphasic to ANG, but somewhat less severe, performing in the high average 
range on the IQ test, Advanced Progressive Matrices and in the superior range on WAIS 
Block Design. However, such a comparison involves many disparate cognitive components. 
It is not comparable with the Varley et al study of syntactic aspects of arithmetic, where there 
was excellent matching between verbal and non-verbal tasks. 
 
One type of task which requires active thought and has been studied in both verbal and non-
verbal forms in the same patients is that of fluency - generation of items defined by a 
particular criterion. Phonemic fluency, generating as many words as possible in a fixed time 
beginning with a particular letter, has been extensively studied by neuropsychologists since 
the pioneering work of Brenda Milner. It is standardly much impaired in dynamic aphasic 
patients. In a study of Robinson et al (2012) performance on this test was compared with that 
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on seven other fluency tasks. In a sample of 40 frontal patients, out of the 11 who performed 
worse than any healthy control on phonemic fluency, 6 had left inferior frontal gyrus lesions, 
as one would expect if it is a sign of dynamic aphasia.  
 
Patients with left lateral lesions in the sample did not generally have word production 
impairments. On a naming test their scores were similar to those of right lateral lesion 
patients and not significantly different from those of normal controls. Yet on phonemic 
fluency they produced only just over 50% of the number of words that right lateral patients 
did.  By contrast, on producing as many designs as they could, given certain constraints, they 
performed equally well. Thus CH, for instance, was well within the normal range. Even more 
surprising, the left lateral patients performed similarly to the right lateral patients in the 
ideational fluency task- eg. “How many uses you can think of for a brick?”.  By comparison 
with right lateral lesion patients their fluency deficit was restricted to verbal material. We 
assume that a phonemic fluency deficit, if word production processes are intact, is a sign of 
impairment in the production of the preverbal message by the Conceptualiser stage. Then, it 
would appear that this process, at least in part, is purely in the language domain and not just 
reliant on general active thought processes. 
 
ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITES FOR ACTIVE THOUGHT  
Volition and Concentration 
In this section, we deal with processes which might be considered as the nuts and bolts of 
active thought. We start with the most basic prerequisites for active thought, volition and 
concentration.   Clinically, syndromes such as apathy and akinetic mutism, the failure to 
initiate actions or speech (Cummings, 1993), which represent the extreme loss of volition, 
have been associated with lesions to the medial PFC.  
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Formal neuropsychological testing supports the idea of a weakening of processes underlying 
volition in superior medial prefrontal lesions.  In the so-called ROBBIA set of studies (Stuss 
& Alexander, 2007; Shallice & Gillingham, 2012), the Stuss-Alexander  subdivision of the 
frontal cortices with 40+ frontal patients was adopted. These studies included simple reaction 
time, two versions of choice reaction time, task switching and go-no-go.  In none of these 
paradigms was the left or right lateral or the inferior medial group significantly slower than 
the normal controls. In all of them, however, the superior medial group were significantly 
slower than normal subjects and, in most, significantly slower than the other patient groups. 
Moreover, the effects were large.   Thus, in one task, the healthy control group took on 
average 607ms, the other three patient groups from 533 to 643ms, but the superior medial 
group 821ms. In addition, in the more difficult conditions, such as the switch condition in 
task switching compared with the repeat condition, the superior medial group were 
disproportionately slowed.  
Stuss et al (1995, 2005) argued that the primary impairment of the superior medial group in 
these tasks is one of “energisation”.  They argued that on the Supervisory System model, 
contention scheduling operating alone would not be optimal in reaction time tasks. For 
instance, a selected schema would gradually lose activation over several seconds. Thus, for 
better performance, top-down boosting of lower-level action schemas would be needed.  
Energisation, then, is seen as the process required toinitiate Supervisory System operations. 
This closely corresponds to a number of characterisations of the function of the anterior 
cingulate derived from functional imaging, such as those of Posner & Girolamo (1998) and 
Kerns et al (2004). It may be seen as the material substrate of volition and the basis of 
concentration.  
On this approach, impairments following superior medial lesions should be found much more 
widely even on cognitively simple tasks. They are. Thus, MacPherson et al (2010) 
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investigated the performance of 55 frontal patients, subdivided into medial, orbital and lateral 
subgroups, on the Elevator Counting subtest (Manly et al., 1994). This assesses the ability to 
sustain attention by presenting a long series of tones at a slow rate. Optimally one simply 
counts the tones. Medial and left lateral groups were significantly impaired on the task 
compared to healthy controls, with the medial group making 13% errors in comparison to the 
controls 1.6%. In contrast, the right lateral patients were not impaired. 
Energization impairments could also account for certain medial frontal findings reported in 
two studies discussed above.  In Robinson et al’s (2012) fluency study, the medial frontal 
group, unlike the lateral frontal groups, was impaired on all eight fluency tasks so an 
energisation account is more plausible than  a purely cognitive one.  Medial frontal lesions 
are also the predominant site for  the grasp reflex and utilization behavior, where the task is 
simple and all that is required is to realise the will to do it.   In lay terms the superior medial 
region can be seen as the locus of the system producing volition and concentration. 
Set-Switching and Response Inhibition 
A second prerequisite for active thought is flexibility. Classically the best-known deficit 
following prefrontal lesions was, indeed, that of switching set. This leads to a consequent 
increase in perseveration, as in the Wisconsin Card Sorting test, which loads heavily on the 
ability to switch responding from one perceptual dimension being critical to another (Milner, 
1963). 
Such clinical tests are, however, complex and have multiple components including a 
discovery one. Much cleaner are so-called ‘task switching’ paradigms in which two  simple 
tasks, which use the same stimuli, are carried out repeatedly in a rapid random ordering. 
Three studies have used such paradigms with 35 or more frontal patients (Aron et al, 2004; 
Shallice et al, 2008; Tsuchida & Fellows, 2013).  All three studies showed left frontal patients 
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to have either increased error rates early in learning (Shallice et al, 2008) or increased 
reaction times each time the task switched. Aron et al suggested (2004) that what is impaired 
in these patients is top-down (Supervisory) control of task-set (action schema). Regarding the 
critical anatomical areas, a VLSM analysis carried out by Tsuchida & Fellows was in 
agreement with a meta-analysis of functional imaging studies carried out by Derrfuss et al 
(2005), suggesting that the left inferior frontal junction is critical for task switching.  
However, Aron et al also reported increased error rates in task switching  in patients with 
right ventrolateral lesions. They attributed this to impairment in response inhibition. 
However, no such effect was found in either of the other studies.  Aron et al (2003) had 
previously used a standard response inhibition task from human experimental psychology, 
namely the stop signal task, with the same 17 right frontal patients, but unfortunately no other 
frontal group. For five right frontal subregions, the correlation between amount of damage to 
the subregion and poor performance on the task was examined. For three of the regions the 
correlation was significant, but for one – the inferior frontal gyrus – it was very high.  The 
authors argued that this was the critical region involved in response inhibition, with the other 
significant effects arising due to correlations between amount of damage in neighbouring 
regions. 
Very different results were, though, obtained by Picton et al (2007) who studied 43 frontal 
patients with another response inhibition task – go-no-go. They found the critical areas for 
false alarms were left areas 6 and 8, areas Aron et al did not investigate. The four patients 
with lesions there made 30% false alarms. By comparison, the 13 patients with right 
ventrolateral lesions made only 12% false alarms, not significantly different from the control 
(8%).   Thus, the effects found in Aron et al’s right frontal patients did not replicate in the 
two other task switching studies. The  neuropsychological evidence overall fits better with a 
different perspective coming from neuroimaging suggesting that the role of the right inferior 
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PFC in such tasks is bottom-up attention rather than  inhibition (Hampshire et al, 2010).  
When a stop signal occurs after the initiating stimulus, attention must then be switched to the 
new stimulus.  This is not required in  Go-no-go tasks. 
Active monitoring and checking  
Error detection is an ubiquitous aspect of human active thought, especially when a new skill 
is being acquired. It begins with a mismatch between actuality and expectation but this can be 
detected by a variety of means, some very subtle (Rizzo et al, 1995). So monitoring and 
checking are basic processes late in the time course of active thought.  Neuropsychologically, 
these processes have long been thought to be controlled by dorsolateral PFC  systems 
(Petrides, 1994).  
Neuropsychological evidence suggests they are, at least partly, lateralised to the right. Stuss 
et al (2005) asked 38 frontal patients, anatomically divided into the four Stuss-Alexander 
groups, to carry out reaction time tests, when the stimulus was preceded by a warning signal 
which occurred randomly from 3s to 7s before. For the simple RT condition, controls 
responded 30ms to 40ms more rapidly to the long than the short warning intervals - the so-
called foreperiod effect. This is to be expected as the conditional probability of the stimulus 
occurring in a particular interval increases with the foreperiod. Three of the four frontal 
patient groups behaved in an identical fashion. One exception was the right lateral group 
which were actually slower in the long foreperiod condition. By contrast, when the foreperiod 
was fixed over a block of trials, the right lateral group behaved normally. Stuss et al argued 
that in the variable foreperiod condition, the right lateral group failed to monitor that no 
stimulus had occurred and so did not increase preparation. When monitoring was not required 
because the foreperiod was constant over a block, they behaved normally. Thus active 
monitoring was held to occur in the right lateral frontal area. 
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Qualitatively similar results have been obtained in a TMS study of Vallesi et al (2007a) in 
which stimulation of right dorsolateral PFC was contrasted with that to left dorsolateral PFC 
and to right angular gyrus. In a more direct attempt to replicate the precise paradigm used by 
Stuss et al, Vallesi et al (2007b) studied 58 patients with fairly focal tumours. They obtained 
a partial replication. Premotor patients and parietal patients had foreperiod effects of the order 
of 30-55ms both before and after operation, the same as normal controls. Left prefrontal 
patients showed a reduced foreperiod effect of 15-25ms, both before and after operation. The 
right prefrontal patients, however, were completely normal before operation with a foreperiod 
effect of 55ms, but this was drastically reduced to 10ms after operation.  
A number of neuroimaging studies point to a similar conclusion with respect to the 
involvement of right rather than left PFC. Thus, Fleck et al (2006) found that it was the right 
lateral PFC, too, which was more active in low confidence judgements where more 
monitoring is needed than in high confidence ones in both memory and perceptual tasks (see 
also Sharp et al, 2004: Chua et al, 2006; Yokoyama et al, 2010 and for another 
neuropsychological example Reverberi et al, 2005, but with only the first and fourth of these  
giving a specifically lateral localisation  within the right PFC). Overall, there is some support 
for  lateral regions within the right PFC being the most critical for active monitoring 
processes. 
Working memory 
The reader may be surprised that an obvious requirement for active thought that has not been 
mentioned is working memory.  Working memory has been associated with the lateral PFC  
since the neurophysiological work of Fuster and Goldman-Rakic. However, these classic 
neurophysiological experiments typically involved the monkey holding one position in space 
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for up to 30s or so. Human working memory tasks involve the subject making operations on 
the much greater contents of a short-term store.  
When short-term memory tasks are given to patients with frontal lesions, they can exhibit no 
deficits if operations do not need to be carried out on the contents of the relevant short term 
memory store. Thus, D’Esposito & Postle (1999) reviewed all studies they could find that 
compared groups of patients with lateral frontal lesions and normal controls on tasks that only 
load on short-term store capacity and do not involve operations. There were eight such 
studies for digit span and four for spatial span; none showed a significant difference between 
the two groups. Thus, while “working memory” tasks can produce deficits in frontal patients, 
the impairment does not appear to be of storage, but of monitoring or manipulation,  as 
argued by Petrides (1994). We have just discussed monitoring above.  In the next section, we 
will discuss how manipulation can take different forms, each  associated with different 
prefrontal regions. 
 
FORMS OF ACTIVE THOUGHT 
Abstraction 
A key human ability for much higher level thinking is the ability to abstract. Goldstein 
(1936), having worked with soldiers   with war wounds and particularly those affecting 
frontal cortex, described them as having a ‘loss of abstract attitude’. Goldstein’s concept 
‘abstract attitude’ was rather complex. However, one way it can be operationalised is with the 
clinical test of giving the interpretation of proverbs. 46 patients with frontal lesions, 
subdivided into left lateral, right lateral and medial groups, were tested by Murphy et al 
(2013) using a Proverb Interpretation test (PIT) adapted from Delis et al. (2001). This 
assesses the ability to interpret a statement in an abstract rather than a concrete sense.  Thus, 
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for “Rome was not built in a day”, a generalised understanding is that any great achievement  
takes patience and time to complete.  A concrete  understanding may refer to the time it takes 
to complete buildings or infrastructure or even  to establish the Roman Empire. Medial 
frontal patients were the only frontal subgroup significantly impaired on the PIT, relative to 
healthy controls. However, their most frequent responses were ‘partially correct’ ones (e.g. 
“Things take time, but you will get there in the end.”; so an energisation deficit seems 
plausible.  However, looking in more detail at the errors made by the left lateral group, 45 % 
were concrete, indicating an inability to produce an abstraction. By contrast, only 12% of 
right lateral errors were and 8% of those made by healthy controls. A related finding was 
made by McDonald et al (2008) who found that epileptic patients with a left frontal focus 
produced poorer abstraction responses on this test than those with a right frontal focus.  The 
left lateral region seems critical for abstraction, at least in the verbal domain. 
Neuropsychological studies have not yet produced a tighter localisation of any abstraction 
process in the comprehension of so-called “figurative language”. Imaging studies are not 
entirely consistent, but the most common site is the left inferior frontal gyrus ( e.g. Rapp et al, 
2004; see also Papagno et al, 2009 for convergent TMS evidence). Shallice & Cooper (2013) 
have argued that the representation of abstract concepts requires a neural architecture that 
supports the construction of hierarchical structures and this is carried out in the left inferior 
frontal gyrus. 
Of course, abstraction also occurs in non-verbal domains.  For instance, it is an important 
component process in carrying out non-verbal IQ tests, such as the Progressive Matrices or 
the Cattell Culture Fair. However, to tackle these tests requires many other processes too, so 
they cannot easily be used to localise non-verbal abstraction. One study that begins to bear on 
this issue is that of Reverberi et al (2005).  They tested 40 frontal patients  on the Brixton task 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1996a) where subjects must abstract the rules of how a blue circle 
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moves across successive cards, each containing  a 2x5 array of circles.  Left lateral patients 
were impaired even with good working memory but this was not the case for the other frontal 
groups.  Recently, Urbanski et al (2016) used analogy tasks which are somewhat simpler than 
fluid  intelligence tests, yet require abstraction.  Patients were requested to find an analogy 
between a source set and one of two candidate sets of coloured letters of varying size. The 
critical region using VLSM was the anterior lateral PFC, again on the left. However, only 27 
patients were included in this study, so coverage of the frontal lobes was rather patchy. 
Deduction 
Induction is the process by which one produces a novel conclusion from the information 
currently available, prototypically in the articulation of a new scientific theory.   Producing a 
novel abstraction, the process just discussed, is a key aspect of induction. The complement to 
induction within reasoning is deduction, where conclusions follow logically and so certainly 
from the assumptions, the premises.  Deduction is, however, somewhat difficult to isolate 
neuropsychologically as tests typically involve multiple premises. So, in addition to language 
comprehension, it relies heavily on working memory. While the effect of this factor can be 
mitigated by allowing premises to remain visible, it is difficult to eliminate completely.  
With functional imaging, the complex stages of processing involved in deduction can be 
tracked over time.  Thus,  Reverberi et al (2010) used a clever complex design to attempt to 
isolate in time when subjects, following interpretation of premises, were making logical 
inferences. Activation increased particularly in left areas 44 and 45. This result is broadly 
consistent with earlier functional imaging studies of deduction (eg Goel et al, 2000). 
However, the complexity of this study would make converging neuropsychological data 
valuable. Yet lesions to the putatively critical areas typically produce aphasic problems which 
interfere with the interpretation of individual premises.  Probably one of the most extensive 
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study of classical deduction in frontal patients was conducted by Reverberi and colleagues 
(2009). 36 frontal patients were tested on their ability to process one-, two-, or three-premise 
syllogisms. However, aphasic patients were excluded and this resulted in no patients having 
lesions overlapping the critical areas left 44 and 45.  Notably, however the performance of 
right lateral patients was indistinguishable from healthy controls, unlike that of left lateral and 
medial patients. Deduction like abstraction is a left frontal process at least when the stimuli 
used are verbal. 
Reasoning in well-structured and less well-structured problem-spaces 
A well-structured problem-space is one, where, as in games like chess or puzzles like the 
Tower-of-Hanoi, the start position and goal are clearly specified. The consequences of 
selecting one from the finite set of alternatives available at any stage of problem solution are 
also well-specified in advance. By contrast a less well-structured problem-space, more typical 
of real-life, is a problem situation where at least one of these conditions does not hold, as in 
planning cooking a meal for guests.  
Tower tasks involve moving balls on pegs to achieve a goal position in the minimum number 
of moves. They constitute a non-verbal well-structured domain and have been extensively 
investigated neuropsychologically. The two studies involving most patients are a Tower of 
London study of Shallice (1982) with 61 patients and a Tower of Hanoi study of Morris et al 
(1997) with 59 patients. Both tasks included conflict situation trials in which early in the 
solution the subject must move a ball in the opposite direction to its eventual goal peg. The 
two studies used the classical group approach and both found a selective impairment in left 
frontal patients. Of particular interest, in the Morris et al study this was specifically for 
conflict situation trials occurring relatively early in the testing period.  
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Tasks such as these require  what Petrides (1994) called manipulation of working memory 
contents, which he localised in  dorsolateral PFC. In particular, they involve, among other 
processes, updating of the contents of working memory (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). These 
two Tower studies do not speak to the specific  localisation within the left frontal lobe. More 
recently, functional imaging studies of these tasks generally support the Petrides view (Kaller 
et al, 2011; Crescentini et al, 2012). Thus different processes are presumably involved from 
those underlying verbal deduction.  
Returning to the issue of less well-structured problem spaces, Goel et al (2007) used tasks 
which were either explicitly spatial or could be mapped onto spatial, such as “Mary is smarter 
than John. John is smarter than Michael. Mary is smarter than Michael. Does it follow?”  For 
half of the problems it did not follow. For these, half again of the problems were 
indeterminate like “Sarah is prettier than Heather. Sarah is prettier than Diane. Diane is 
prettier than Heather.” The problems were given to 18 frontal patients. Goel and colleagues 
found that for the determinate problems, both valid and invalid (eg Michael is smarter than 
Mary), the left frontal group was worse than either healthy controls or the right frontal group. 
However, for the indeterminate problems, not well-structured, it was the right frontal group 
who were much worse than either of the other two groups, who did not differ..  
Goel et al use the mental models approach of Johnson-Laird (1983) and hold that the 
indeterminate problems require the construction of at least two models for the alternative 
possibilities together with a representation that one or the other can be correct.  They further 
argued that the left frontal lobe is adept at constructing determinate and unambiguous 
representations, whereas the right frontal lobe is needed to maintain “fluid, indeterminate, 
vague and ambiguous representations” (p. 2249). The study of Goel et al is rather small for 
strong theoretical conclusions, but as we will see its results resonate with other findings. 
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From lateral transformations to strategy shifts 
In an earlier paper, a single case study of an architect who had had a right frontal meningioma 
removed, Goel & Grafman (2000) made a different if related contrast between the functions 
of the left and right PFC. Despite having an IQ of 125 and a maintained ability to carry out 
the basic skills of his profession, the patient was unable to operate effectively as an architect.  
Goel & Grafman argued that he had retained the ability to make what they called “vertical 
transformations”, namely more detailed versions of the same idea. What he had lost was held 
to be the ability to make “lateral transformations”, where one moves from one idea to a 
different type of idea, which the authors held to be a function of the right frontal lobe. 
Support for a related idea comes from a rather surprising source.  In the attempt to develop a 
task requiring cognitive inhibition, Burgess & Shallice (1996b) invented the Hayling 
Sentence Completion Test. In section B, subjects are presented with a sentence frame, such as 
The ship sank very close to the …. The task of the subject is to give a word unrelated to the 
completion of the sentence or to any word in the sentence. Banana would be an example.  In 
an initial study of 91 patients, the Hayling B test proved to be highly sensitive to frontal 
lesions. Patients with anterior lesions produced more than double the error score of either 
posterior-lesioned patients or healthy controls. No significant lateralisation effects were 
found.  
This looks like a difficulty in inhibition. However, it was noted that after a few trials, healthy 
controls tended to develop a strategy of looking round the room to select an object or of 
making an association with their previous response. Their aim was to produce a word before 
the sentence frame was presented. They then no longer had to inhibit the completion; they 
merely had to check that their already generated word did not by chance relate to the sentence 
frame. Anterior-lesioned patients gave far fewer responses that fitted either of these two 
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strategies than did posterior-lesioned patients or healthy controls. They did not generate an 
effective strategy to circumvent the difficulty of the task. 
Three studies indicated there are surprising right frontal involvements in this entirely verbal 
task.  Roca et al (2010) were examining the extent to which fluid intelligence scores could 
explain frontal deficits in a number of tasks with 44 frontal patients. As discussed earlier, 
they found that for five tasks, one of which was a much shortened version of the Hayling test, 
the frontal deficit could not be explained as merely a consequence of impairment in fluid IQ. 
Six patients performed particularly badly on this set of tasks. Five of them had right frontal 
lesions.    
In the second study using the full Hayling test, Volle et al (2012) tested 45 patients with focal 
cortical lesions. They then used two critical lesion localisation procedures. For both clinical 
measures of Hayling B, of reaction time and errors respectively, the critical lesion sites were 
in the right frontal lobe. For the more sensitive lesion localisation procedure, the reaction 
time slowing localised to right lateral areas 45 and 47, and increased errors to right 
orbitofrontal area 11.  
Robinson et al (2015) gave the test to 90 focal frontal lesion patients, and used the Stuss-
Alexander grouping method. On the reaction time measure, it was the right lateral group that 
were grossly slow - worse than four times the healthy control group - while the left lateral 
group did not differ from controls. On the error measure, it was the right lateral group again 
that was the only patient group significantly worse than controls, making more than three 
times as high an error score.  Moreover, they made very few responses indicating use of an 
effective strategy. More specifically, within the lateral frontal cortex, it was the inferior 
regions again where the difference lay between the effects of left and right lesions.  
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More specifically, the performance on the Hayling test of right frontal patients with lateral 
and orbitofrontal lesions was compared on a new small sample. Right lateral patients were 
found to make many suppression errors, to produce very few strategy-connected words and to 
require longer ‘thinking’ times, known to correlate with fewer strategy responses. In contrast 
the orbitofrontal group performed normally. This supports  the notion that it is the inferior 
right lateral  cortex rather than the orbitofrontal cortex that is involved in strategy production 
(Cipolotti et al 2015c). 
A general inhibition problem is an implausible explanation of the right lateral impairment. 
Cipolotti et al (2016) tested 30 frontal patients on both the Hayling task and the Stroop. The 
right frontal group was much worse than the left frontal one on the Hayling task, but for the 
Stroop there was an insignificant effect in the other direction.  
By contrast, the notion that the right inferior lateral regions are critical for novel strategy 
production in problem-solving has been supported by two  studies, one employing functional 
imaging and the other cortical thickness differences across normal subjects.  Both studies 
used problem-solving tasks which involve an insightful lateral move to produce a novel 
strategy. One was Guilford’s matchstick task (Goel & Vartanian, 2005), the other the so-
called Nim or Subtraction game (Seyed-Allaei, in press). Both found the critical area to be 
right area 47. Whether its role lies in the creation of a novel structure or plan or the 
realisation of the inadequacy of an earlier strategy remains to be established. 
Planning for future action 
Reasoning needs to be implemented in action, and often after a gap in time. Intentions need to 
be set up and realised later. Typically, other tasks have to be carried out in the interval. So, 
one has a multitasking situation. Shallice & Burgess (1991) described three frontal patients 
who performed well on a wide range of clinical tests of frontal lobe function but were 
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specifically impaired when given two tests of multitasking. Each of these tests - Six Elements 
and Multiple Errands - required patients to organise themselves to interleave a number of 
different tasks without cues as to when to switch, while obeying a set of simple rules written 
on a card in front of them. This study showed that multitasking was a separable frontal 
function. The one patient, AP, in whom the lesion could be well localised, had a bilateral 
lesion of frontopolar cortex (areas10 and 11) (Shallice & Cooper, 2011).  Burgess et al (2000) 
used another multitasking test, the Greenwich, which required three different tasks to be 
interleaved over 10 minutes. When memory was not impaired, poor overall performance was 
associated with lesions to the more polar and medial aspects of areas 8,9,10.  Area 10 appears 
to be critical. Roca et al (2011) compared 7 frontal patients with area 10 damage to 8 without.  
They were more impaired in multitasking but less so on response inhibition and abstract 
reasoning. 
That the temporal aspect of setting up and realising intentions may indeed be the core deficit 
of the multitasking impairment is shown by a study of Volle et al (2011). With the assistance 
of a stopwatch, 45 patients with focal lesions had to press a spacebar every 30s while 
carrying out another task. The 8 patients with area 10 lesions pressed the spacebar once every 
48s by comparison with every 32s for the other patients.  On control tasks not involving time, 
the area 10 patients were unimpaired.   
Functional imaging studies, too, have given strong parallel evidence for the involvement of 
bilateral area 10 in multitasking, and in particular of the generation and realisation of 
intentions (Koechlin et al, 1999; Burgess et al, 2001, 2011). 
 
THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
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In this review we have focused on neuropsychological group studies of what we termed 
active thought and in the localisation of the principal processing components of a variety of 
tasks involving it.  We have assumed that different localisations imply different 
computational functions. The most basic conclusion one draws from the neuropsychological 
literature is that the prefrontal cortex has a complex computational structure with a large set 
of subsystems combining to realise active thought. This is because impairments at the 
Supervisory level differ qualitatively on at least some combinations of lateral vs medial, left 
vs right, anterior vs posterior prefrontal and dorsal vs ventral. 
In addition, most  “frontal” tasks involve  many components. Hence, the complexity of the 
neurocognitive architecture could well be greater than neuropsychological group studies 
alone currently indicate. This is because they  pick out one or  a very few critical regions. For 
instance, we have shown that right lateral frontal systems for novel strategy selection are 
important in carrying out the Hayling task. Yet Robinson et al (2016) have recently described 
two patients with different types of difficulty on the task, one clearly of inhibition. Both had 
left frontal lesions! The task undoubtedly involves multiple systems relevant for active 
thought. 
In this case why are neuropsychological studies valuable? They clearly show the affected 
systems are crucial.  In addition, though, they complement functional imaging findings 
informatively, both with respect to lateralisation of function and to the role of networks or 
their constituent subsystems.  Regarding lateralization of functions, one frequently obtains 
the impression from the imaging literature that the two frontal cortices have basically 
equivalent functions; activation is often bilateral. The neuropsychological literature provides 
a different perspective.  The two lateral prefrontal cortices appear to have markedly different 
functions with respect to active thought.  
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There are a number of different ways in which these contrasting functions have been 
characterised. Thus, Stuss & Alexander (2007) and Shallice & Gillingham (2012) contrast 
task-setting, setting up a program (left), with active monitoring (right). The latter is well 
supported by the currently reviewed studies, the former by the Morris et al study of Tower of 
Hanoi. Goel and colleagues (2000, 2007), instead, make the contrast between vertical 
operations in a well-structured problem space (left) and lateral ones in an ill-structured space 
(right). This fits the results on deduction and the Tower-tasks (left) and the Hayling task well.  
Computationally, one can combine these two sets of contrasts. The left lateral region, 
becomes the site where Duncan’s serially operating program is realised; this fits too with the 
task switching studies. The program then runs on systems in premotor and posterior cortices. 
By contrast, the right lateral region would be where processes operate in parallel either 
separately to detect any from a range of potential errors (active monitoring) or in combination  
to produce a novel strategy. This would fit with the left lateral region having a much higher 
degree of internal inhibition than the right, since at each stage it selects top-down  one from a 
range of possible thought and action schemas.  
Within the left lateral frontal lobe, the contrasting localisations of deduction (ventrolateral) 
and Tower-task operations (dorsolateral) fits roughly with a Petrides-like anatomical 
perspective. Cognitively, the contrast supports the view that rule-based mental logic and 
mental model-based reasoning both exist but rely on anatomically different systems (Goel, 
2007). As far as mental model-based reasoning is concerned, Knauff (2013) has argued that 
the model itself is parietally located, and the existence of a qualitatively organised 
representation of objects in space in the right parietal lobe (Buiatti et al, 2011) supports this.  
Regarding the contrast between neuropsychology and functional imaging on the role of 
networks or their constituent subsystems, imaging provides evidence on the network of 
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systems involved in task execution.  Focal lesion patients instead provide evidence ideally on 
single systems. From this perspective, Duncan & Owen’s fronto-parietal multiple demand 
network, may be seen as composed by a variety of special-purpose subsystems which 
combine to realise, for instance, mental model-based reasoning in tests of fluid IQ. 
The clearest example of this functional distinction between parts of the network, is the 
contrast between lesions to lateral and superior medial frontal regions.  Both contain parts of 
the multiple demand network. However, lesions affect the two regions differently across a 
range of neuropsychological tests, including reaction time, fluency and reasoning tasks.  On 
the current approach the superior medial PFC energises supervisory operations, but the lateral 
PFC implements them; the two regions have different functions.  
The impaired performance on different tasks of patients with lesions in the same region, can 
also give rise to theoretical questions. Consider the left inferior frontal region. We argued that 
it is involved in constructing the preverbal message, but also in the representation of 
abstraction. Both of these require hierarchically organised structures relating to language. But 
do they involve the same system? We will not know until it is investigated whether 
dissociations can exist between tasks involving them. 
Neuropsychological findings on active thought do not just show that certain brain systems are 
critical for task-execution. In addition, they complement findings from functional imaging in 
two different ways. Rather than giving information on whole networks, they highlight the 
role of the systems of which they are composed. Secondly, rather than downplaying 
differential lateralisation of function, they emphasise it.  Whether they can also help with the 
key question of how these supervisory systems interact remains to be seen. 
Summary Points 
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1. For active thought processes, neuropsychology provides valuable evidence on 
underlying functional subsystems, and their lateralisation, rather than on whole 
networks.  
2. For medial PFC the subsystems, to which such evidence relates,  are critical for 
energising supervisory processes. 
3. For left lateral PFC, they are critical for top-down schema activation, updating, 
deduction and more anteriorly, abstraction. 
4. For left ventrolateral PFC, they  help to construct preverbal messages.  
5. For right lateral PFC, they underpin active monitoring and, more inferiorly, are 
critically involved in production of novel strategies.  
6. For frontopolar PFC a key role is the setting-up and maintenance of intentions. 
Future Issues 
1. For models of fronto-parietal control networks, of which the multiple demand 
network is one, are the frontal components functionally different or functionally 
equivalent to the parietal components? 
2. Does the left lateral PFC have stronger inhibition internal to the region than the right 
lateral PFC, as suggested above?  
3. For some claimed processes (eg active monitoring) and even some tasks (eg Hayling 
B), there is a broad agreement across studies about which frontal lobe plays the more 
critical role, but there is disagreement over the  specific parts of the lobe responsible. 
Is this due to variations across samples of patients tested or due to subtle differences 
in the cognitive processes employed to perform the particular version of the task used. 
4. Abstraction and forming a preverbal message both involve more anterior parts of the 
inferior left lateral frontal lobe. Do they have any processes in common? For instance, 
extrapolating from  Hagoort’s (2013) ideas on localisation of so-called unification 
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processes, could  the region be required for the construction of multi=-level structures 
(Shallice & Cooper, 2013). 
5. Are impairments following lesions to the inferior lateral right frontal region in tasks 
like the stop task due to impairments to systems controlling response inhibition or to 
those controlling bottom-up attention? 
6. What are  the involvements of the right frontal region in novel strategy attainment 
tasks, such as Hayling B?  Does it contain systems that create a novel structure or 
plan, or systems determining that the preceding strategy was inadequate and so needs 
changing, or are there yet further possibilities? 
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